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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a 5-4 opinion with multiple dissents, the Supreme Court struck 
down a federal law that increased the campaign contribution limits 
applicable to a Congressional candidate whose opponent exceeded a 
threshold amount of personal expenditures.1 Congress passed the law 
as part of a congressional effort to limit the influence of campaign 
contributions on national elections.2 According to the majority, the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), or the 
“Millionaire’s Amendment,” violated the First Amendment because it 
operated as a significant burden on the ability of candidates to self-
finance their own campaigns.3 Moreover, the BCRA did not serve any 
compelling state interest that would justify the imposition of such a 
burden on a candidate’s ability to finance his own political speech.4 
The Court’s decision reversed a District Court ruling that had upheld 
the constitutionality of the law on the grounds that the BCRA did not 
operate as a burden on the ability of a self-financed candidate to fund 
his campaign because it merely allowed his opponent to increase his 
political speech through greater contribution limits.5 The ruling in 
Davis was largely based on Buckley v. Valeo, a Supreme Court 
decision handed down thirty-two years earlier that held that limits on 
personal expenditures were subject to more scrutiny than 
contribution limits.6 
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 1. Davis v. FEC (Davis), 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008). 
 2. Davis v. FEC (Davis v. FEC), 501 F. Supp. 2d 22, 25 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 3. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2771. 
 4. Id. at 2772–73. 
 5. Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d. at 29. 
 6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976). 
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One of the Supreme Court’s central conclusions in Davis was that 
the only compelling state interests that can justify “a substantial 
burden on the exercise of the First Amendment right to use personal 
funds for campaign speech” are reducing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.7 Although Justice Stevens, in a dissent 
joined by Justice Souter, advocated abandoning the disparate 
treatment of expenditure and contribution limits established by prior 
precedent,8 the Court was not persuaded by the dissenting Justices’ 
reasoning and instead scrutinized the BCRA very closely because it 
was “a limit on personal expenditures.”9 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Congress passed the BCRA to limit the influence of wealth on 
national elections.10 One element of the BCRA was the so-called 
“Millionaire’s Amendment,” which increased the amount of 
contributions a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives could 
receive from individual donors when his opponent’s personal 
expenditures exceeded a certain amount.11 The Millionaire’s 
Amendment was enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Buckley v. Valeo, which upheld strict campaign contribution limits 
but struck down similar limits on a candidate’s personal 
expenditures.12 
Under the Millionaire’s Amendment, when a candidate’s 
expenditure of personal funds caused the “opposition personal funds 
amount” (“OPFA”) to exceed $350,000, the opposing candidate could 
receive individual contributions of $6,900, or three times the normal 
limit of $2,300.13 The OPFA “is a statistic that compares the 
 
 7. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772–73 (holding that the burden the Millionaire’s Amendment 
places on the self-financed candidate “is not justified by any governmental interest in 
eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption” because the Court had previously held 
that “reliance on personal funds reduces the threat of corruption”). 
 8. Id. at 2778 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 9. Id. at 2772. 
 10. Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 25. 
 11. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a) (2006). There were also disclosure requirements for any 
candidate who intended to spend personal funds in excess of $350,000 as well as disclosure 
requirements once the candidate actually spent over $350,000 of his own funds. See §441a-
1(b)(1). 
 12. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51–54 (1976). 
 13. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a)(1)(A)–(C). 
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expenditure of personal funds by competing candidates and also takes 
into account to some degree certain other fundraising.”14 
Despite the requirements of the Millionaire’s Amendment, Jack 
Davis relied on his personal wealth to finance two unsuccessful 
Congressional campaigns in 2004 and 2006.15 Davis spent close to $1.2 
million of his own funds in 2004 and $2.275 million of his own funds in 
2006.16 Davis’s opponent spent no personal funds and did not receive 
any contributions above the normal limits even though he was eligible 
to receive an extra $1.5 million as a result of Davis’s personal 
expenditures.17 
In June of 2006, Davis filed suit against the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) in District Court for the District of Columbia 
arguing that the Millionaire’s Amendment should be held 
unconstitutional on its face and that the FEC should be enjoined from 
enforcing it during the 2006 election.18 Davis and the FEC both 
moved for summary judgment, and the FEC’s motion was granted by 
a three-judge panel in the District Court.19 
According to the District Court, to prove a First Amendment 
violation, Davis needed to demonstrate that the Millionaire’s 
Amendment burdened the exercise of political speech and that it was 
not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.20 The court 
concluded that the Millionaire’s Amendment did not burden the 
exercise of political speech because “[i]t place[d] no restrictions on a 
candidate’s ability to spend unlimited amounts of his personal 
wealth.”21 The increased contribution limits of the Millionaire’s 
Amendment were “similar to statutes that permit higher contribution 
limits for candidates who agree to public financing of their 
campaigns.”22 
Instead of restricting political speech, the court believed that the 
Millionaire’s Amendment “correct[ed] a potential imbalance in 
resources available to each candidate.”23 Also, the court dismissed 
 
 14. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2766. 
 15. Id. at 2767. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.; Davis v. FEC (Davis v. FEC), 501 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 19. Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d. at 27. 
 20. Id. at 28 (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990)). 
 21. Id. at 29. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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Davis’s argument that the Millionaire’s Amendment chilled political 
speech;24 the court noted that he spent well over $350,000 of his own 
funds during each campaign, so it was clear his own speech was not 
chilled.25 Finally, the District Court upheld the Millionaire’s 
Amendment’s disclosure requirements26 because they did not “burden 
[one’s] First Amendment right to participate freely in political 
activities.”27 
The Supreme Court heard Davis’s appeal of the District Court 
decision because the BCRA designates it as the exclusive avenue for 
appellate review.28 The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the 
District Court and held that the Millionaire’s Amendment violated 
the First Amendment by burdening political speech in furtherance of 
the impermissible goal of equalizing electoral opportunities.29 
III.  HOLDING 
Justice Alito delivered the majority opinion in the 5-4 decision. 
The majority held that the increased contribution limits triggered 
when the OPFA passed $350,000 were a burden on the self-financing 
candidate because they discouraged personal expenditures by the 
candidate.30 The Court reasoned that “[w]hile BCRA does not impose 
a cap on a candidate’s expenditure of personal funds, it imposes an 
unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises that 
First Amendment right.”31 Thus, the Millionaire’s Amendment 
“impermissibly burdens [Davis’s] First Amendment right to spend his 
own money for campaign speech.”32 
 
 24. Id. at 31–32 (Davis argued that the Millionaire’s Amendment would chill personal 
expenditures for candidates who “abhor” the corrupting influence of special interest 
contributions because personal expenditures over $350,000 would increase the amount of 
corrupting contributions the opposing candidate could receive.). 
 25. Id. at 32. 
 26. See 2 U.S.C. §441a-1(b)(1)(The disclosure requirements included: 1) Declaring how 
much personal expenditures in excess of $350,000 the candidate plans on spending; 2) Notifying 
the other candidate within 24 hours of spending $350,000 in personal funds and 3) Notifying the 
other candidate within 24 hours of making every additional $10,000 in personal expenditures 
over $350,000.). 
 27. Id. at 32. 
 28. See 2 U.S.C. § 403 (2006); 2 U.S.C. § 437h (2006) (establishing the procedures and 
jurisdiction for judicial review on the constitutionality of the BRCA). 
 29. Davis v. FEC (Davis), 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2770 (2008). 
 30. See id. at 2771 (holding that some candidates would continue to make personal 
expenditures over $350,000, but some would be discouraged by the Millionaire’s Amendment). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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The Court was eager to cast the holding as a consistent application 
of the principles explicated in Buckley v. Valeo.33 In Buckley, the Court 
struck down a cap on the personal funds a candidate could spend on 
political speech, while upholding the ability of Congress to limit that 
candidate’s expenditure of personal funds as a condition to accepting 
public financing of his campaign.34 Like the cap on a candidate’s 
personal expenditures in Buckley, the majority held that the 
Millionaire’s Amendment imposed a “significant burden” on any 
candidate who wished to exercise her First Amendment right to fund 
campaign speech.35 Also, unlike the limit on personal expenditures 
tied to a candidate’s acceptance of public financing that was upheld in 
Buckley, the Millionaire’s Amendment “does not provide any way in 
which a candidate can exercise that right without abridgment.”36 
Because the Court concluded that the Millionaire’s Amendment is 
a “substantial burden” on a self-financing candidate’s First 
Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign speech, “that 
provision cannot stand unless it is ‘justified by a compelling state 
interest.’”37 According to the Court, the only compelling interests that 
can justify restrictions on campaign expenditures are the prevention 
of corruption or the prevention of the appearance of corruption.38 
Applying the principles of Buckley, the Court held that “reliance on 
personal funds reduces the threat of corruption, and therefore [the 
Millionaire’s Amendment], by discouraging use of personal funds, 
disserves the anticorruption interest.”39 
Although the Government argued that the Millionaire’s 
Amendment’s personal expenditure limit leveled electoral 
opportunities by reducing potential disparity between candidates of 
unequal personal wealth and thus served a compelling interest, the 
Court rejected this as contrary to precedent expressly disavowing 
Congress’s ability to restrict one candidate’s speech in order to 
enhance another’s.40 Also, the Court held that recognizing leveling 
 
 33. See id.  (Buckley established the “fundamental nature of the right to spend personal 
funds for campaign speech”). 
 34. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (also holding that limits on expenditures, both 
personal and total expenditures, were subject to heightened scrutiny compared to contribution 
limits). 
 35. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256 (1986)). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 2773. 
 40. Id. 
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electoral opportunities as a compelling interest would have “ominous 
implications because it would permit Congress to arrogate the voters’ 
authority to evaluate the strengths of candidates competing for 
office.”41 Finally, the Government argued that the Millionaire’s 
Amendment was justified because it “ameliorate[d] the deleterious 
effects” of Buckley’s disparate treatment between contributions and 
expenditures.42 But, because the Government did not argue that 
Buckley’s treatment of contributions and expenditures should be 
rejected, the Court said “it is hard to see how undoing the 
consequences of that decision can be viewed as a compelling 
interest.”43 
Because the Millionaire’s Amendment’s expenditure limits were 
held unconstitutional, its disclosure requirements were also held 
unconstitutional because they “were designed to implement the 
asymmetrical contribution limits provided for in” the Millionaire’s 
Amendment.44 
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Souter 
joined in full, but which Justices Breyer and Ginsburg joined only to 
the extent the dissent argued that the Millionaire’s Amendment was a 
consistent application of Buckley’s principles.45 In Part I of Justice 
Stevens’s dissent, he advocated rejecting Buckley’s treatment of 
expenditure limits as direct restrictions on personal speech. Justice 
Stevens argued that expenditure limits should instead be upheld as 
long as they serve purposes that are legitimate and substantial.46 
Furthermore, he offered two purposes that justify expenditure 
limitations: (1) they free the candidate and staff from the burden of 
fundraising and (2) they improve the quality of the exposition of ideas 
by limiting the quantity but not the content of the speech.47 
In Part II of Justice Stevens’s dissent, which was joined by the 
other three dissenters, he argued that, even within the framework of 
Buckley, the Millionaire’s Amendment was “within the bounds of the 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 2774. 
 43. Id. The Court did not address Davis’ claim that the Millionaire’s Amendment violated 
the Equal Protection clause because the Millionaire’s Amendment was found unconstitutional 
on other grounds. Id. at 2775. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 2777 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 46. Id. at 2778 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 264 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)). 
 47. Id. at 2779. 
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Constitution.”48 Unlike the majority, the dissent did not view the 
Millionaire’s Amendment as a burden on a self-financing candidate, 
but viewed it instead as a mechanism to increase the speech of a 
candidate who is unable to spend mass amounts of personal wealth.49 
The dissent went on to state that even if the Millionaire’s Amendment 
burdened the self-financing candidate’s First Amendment rights, “the 
purposes of the [Millionaire’s] Amendment surely justify its effects.”50 
According to the dissent, the majority was wrong to assert that 
eliminating corruption or the appearance of corruption were the only 
reasons sufficient to restrict campaign expenditures.51 The dissent 
argued that the Court “ha[s] long recognized the strength of an 
independent governmental interest in reducing both the influence of 
wealth on the outcomes of elections, and the appearance that wealth 
alone dictates those results.”52 In support, the dissent pointed to cases 
upholding restrictions on the amount of corporate funds that can be 
contributed to political campaigns,53 and argued that there is no 
reason the principles are “not equally applicable in the context of 
individual wealth.”54 Thus, Justice Stevens argued, the Millionaire’s 
Amendment is constitutional as a carefully crafted congressional 
effort “motivated by proper and weighty goals.”55 
In a separate dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, 
endorsed the District Court’s “careful and persuasive opinion,” which 
upheld the Millionaire’s Amendment.56 She broke from Justice 
Stevens’s dissent and argued that because the FEC did not ask the 
Court to overrule Buckley, she “would leave reconsideration of 
Buckley for a later day.”57 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Among its many conclusions, the Court asserted that the only 
compelling state interests that can justify a substantial burden on a 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 2780. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 2781. 
 53. Id. (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990); FEC v. 
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 2782 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 2782–83. 
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candidate’s First Amendment rights are the prevention of corruption 
or the prevention of the appearance of corruption.58 The dissent 
vigorously disagreed and asserted that even assuming the 
Millionaire’s Amendment burdened Davis’s political speech, 
“[m]inimizing the effect of concentrated wealth on our political 
process, and the concomitant interest in addressing the dangers that 
attend the perception that political power can be purchased, are, 
therefore, sufficiently weighty objectives to justify congressional 
action.”59 The dissent supported its position with cases upholding 
corporate contribution limits on the grounds that they reduced the 
influence of corporate wealth60 and argued that McConnell v. FEC 
supports the proposition that the influence of personal wealth is as 
much a concern as the influence of corporate wealth.61 
Ultimately, the dissent’s argument fails for two reasons. First, the 
dissent cited cases upholding corporate contribution limits to show 
that limiting a wealthy candidate’s ability to use personal 
expenditures to fund political speech is a compelling interest. 
However, Buckley v. Valeo long ago established that expenditure and 
contribution limits merit distinct treatment under the First 
Amendment,62 so cases that limit corporate contributions do not 
support limits on a self-financing candidate’s personal expenditures. 
Corporate contribution limits can be constitutionally sanctioned 
under Buckley because they limit corruption or the appearance of 
corruption, whereas similar justification does not exist for limits on a 
candidate’s personal expenditures. Second, McConnell was concerned 
with “the pernicious influence of large campaign contributions,” so 
the dissent is misguided to use McConnell to support their argument 
that limiting the influence of individual wealth is a compelling 
interest.63 The Millionaire’s Amendment was not related to corporate 
contributions, but was a limit on personal expenditures, which are 
scrutinized much more closely under Buckley. 
 
 58. Id. at 2772 (majority opinion). 
 59. Id. at 2781 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 2782. 
 61. See id. (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, 116 (2003) (“Congress’ historical concern with 
the ‘political potentialities of wealth’ and their ‘untoward consequences for the democratic 
process’ . . . has long reached beyond corporate money.” (quoting United States v. Automobile 
Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 577–78 (1957))). 
 62. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19–21 (1976). 
 63. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 117 (2003). 
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The dissent firmly believed that the Millionaire’s Amendment was 
not a burden at all, but rather that it simply amplified the voice of the 
non-self-financing candidate,64 and argued that the Millionaire’s 
Amendment actually promoted the First Amendment right to 
political speech by “advancing its core principles.”65 It did this by 
“[m]inimizing the effect of concentrated wealth on our political 
process, and the concomitant interest in addressing the dangers that 
attend the perception that political power can be purchased.”66 This is 
a compelling point, and one which the majority vigorously attempted 
to counter by responding that self-financing candidates are reluctant 
to spend over $350,000 of their own funds because this triggers 
increased contribution limits for their opponents.67 
Furthermore, the dissent and majority agreed that the 
Millionaire’s Amendment was a limit on personal expenditures,68 so 
the majority felt forced—by Buckley’s strict treatment of personal 
expenditure limits—to conclude that the Millionaire’s Amendment 
was unconstitutional. This was because the Millionaire’s Amendment 
did not limit corruption or the appearance of corruption, which are 
the only two justifications the majority believed can support limits on 
a candidate’s personal expenditures. 
The majority’s reasoning was further bolstered because it was 
likely that the increased contribution limits, designed by traditionally 
non-self-financing incumbents, were intended to burden candidates 
who choose to self-finance their campaigns. As long as a majority of 
the Court accepts the proposition that schemes like the Millionaire’s 
Amendment should be treated as expenditure limits, and Buckley’s 
rigid treatment of expenditure limits survives, Congress will have 
 
 64. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2780. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 2781. 
 67. See id. at 2772 (The Court acknowledges that a candidate is faced with a choice 
between “[abiding] by a limit on personal expenditures or endur[ing] the burden that is placed 
on that right” by the Millionaire’s Amendment. Also, by writing that “[m]any candidates who 
can afford to make large personal expenditures to support their campaigns may choose to do so 
despite 319(a),” the Court is implying that there are some candidates who will be deterred from 
self-financing by the Millionaire’s Amendment.). 
 68. Id. at 2771 (“While [the Millionaire’s Amendment] does not impose a cap on a 
candidate’s expenditure of personal funds, it imposes an unprecedented penalty on any 
candidate who robustly exercises that First Amendment right.”); id. at 2779 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“If, as I have come to believe, Congress could attempt to reduce the millionaire 
candidate’s advantage by imposing reasonable limits on all candidates’ expenditures, it follows a 
fortiori that the eminently reasonable scheme before us today survives constitutional scrutiny.”). 
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difficulty restricting the ability of wealthy candidate’s to self-finance 
their campaigns. 
 
